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REVERSING THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY IN LAND USE
LITIGATION: IS LEGISLATIVE ACTION
NECESSARY?
DANIEL R. MANDELKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, courts protected land use regulation from constitu-
tional attack by applying a presumption of constitutionality. Recent
cases indicate the courts are no longer as willing to honor the presump-
tion in land use litigation. They have identified interests they consider
unprotected in the land use regulation process and protect these inter-
ests by reversing the presumption. This judicial development deserves
applause.
A Commission on Housing appointed by President Reagan has pro-
posed a more radical change in the presumption of constitutionality.
The Commission studied land use regulation that affects the availabil-
ity of housing and concluded that regulation often was too restrictive.
To remedy this problem, its report recommended legislation that
reverses the presumption in land use litigation. The Commission's
model legislation provides that a zoning regulation "denying or limit-
ing the development of housing" will be "deemed valid" only if "neces-
* Stamper Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. This article is
based on a speech presented at a conference on Affordable Housing at the University of
California, San Diego in March, 1985. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance
of R. Marlin Smith and Christopher Duerksen in developing the ideas contained in this
article.
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sary to achieve a vital and pressing governmental interest." 1 The
Commission also recommended that the governmental body have the
burden to prove in litigation that it complies with this statutory
standard.2
As compared with selective judicial reversal of the presumption, the
Commission proposes a reversal of the presumption in land use cases
through legislative action. This Article argues against adoption of the
"vital and pressing" standard. It reviews cases in which courts have
reversed the presumption and concludes the courts are capable of re-
versing the preemption when presumption reversal is necessary. The
principal case in which they have not reversed the presumption is the
case in which a developer challenges a land use regulation as a taking
of property. Reversal of the presumption is not necessary in this case.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESUMPTION: Carolene Products
Although state courts are the primary interpreters of constitutional
limits on land use law, a Supreme Court decision, United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,' provides the basis for the presumption in con-
stitutional law. In Carolene Products, the Court held that "the exist-
ence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed." 4
Legislation affecting "ordinary commercial transactions" is not uncon-
stitutional unless facts "made known or generally assumed" contradict
the assumption that it rests upon a "rational basis" within legislative
knowledge and experience.'
The Court qualified the presumption in a famous footnote.6 It stated
there may be a "narrower scope" for the presumption when legislation
is within a specific constitutional prohibition, such as the first ten
amendments. These amendments include the free speech clause,7
which applies to land use regulation. The Court also stated it need not
inquire whether "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" also
1. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUSING 200 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
2. Id.
3. 304 U.S. 144.
4. Id. at 152.
5. Id.
6. Id. n.4.
7. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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calls "for a correspondingly more judicial inquiry. , 8 As the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence has developed, legislation affecting "dis-
crete and insular minorities" receives more rigorous judicial review.9
Land use regulation can fall within this category.
The Carolene Products footnote has dominated judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation for decades. The legislative "vital and
pressing" standard recommended by the President's Commission is a
direct attack on Carolene Products. The question is whether legislative
reversal of the Carolene Products presumption is necessary in land use
litigation.
III. JUDICIAL REVERSAL OF THE PRESUMPTION
The discussion that follows is a brief review of cases in which courts
have reversed the presumption in land use cases, in fact if not in name.
The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. It indicates the wide
range of land use cases in which the courts have provided more rigor-
ous judicial review to protect "discrete and insular minorities" from
restrictive land use regulation and to invalidate legislation that restricts
basic constitutional rights.
This judicial revisionism has occurred in both the state and federal
courts. It is by no means complete, and at the state level is limited to a
few jurisdictions in some cases. That judicial revisionism is not com-
plete should not argue against the ability of the courts to provide more
vigorous judicial review in land use cases when they believe it is
necessary.
A. Racial Discrimination Cases
Racial minorities are an obvious example of a "discrete and insular
8. 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
9. Professor Ackerman has suggested that the Carolene Products footnote needs re-
formulation, primarily because it does not accurately distinguish groups disadvantaged
in the political process who need constitutional protection. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). This article does not quarrel with
Professor Ackerman's thesis, but concentrates on whether reversal of the presumption
of constitutionality requires judicial or legislative action. The selective judicial reversal
of the presumption of constitutionality that has occurred in land use cases is consistent
with Professor Ackerman's reformulation of the Carolene Products footnote. See also
Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L Q. 91 (1985) (arguing against Supreme Court's abandonment of economic
due process scrutiny of statutes that enforce monopoly conditions on lawful
occupations)
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minority" that may suffer legislative disadvantage in the land use regu-
lation process.1" The Court reversed the presumption to protect racial
minorities in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp. 11 It held that proof of a racially discriminatory intent
in land use regulation violates the equal protection clause of the federal
Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed a refusal to rezone by a practically all-
white suburban municipality to allow the development of a federally-
subsidized housing project was racially discriminatory. Although the
Court did not uphold the racial discrimination claim in Arlington
Heights,2 and although the decision makes proof of racial discrimina-
tion in land use cases difficult, the Court held that the presumption of
constitutionality is reversed when a racially discriminatory purpose is
shown. 13
The presumption is reversed in an important footnote.1 4 The foot-
note states that proof of partial racial motivation shifts to the munici-
pality "the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."1"
The Court's presumption reversal in racial discrimination land use
cases has doctrinal problems, 6 but follows the Carolene Products foot-
note by isolating land use regulation affecting "discrete and insular"
racial minorities for more rigorous judicial review. Legislative racial
discrimination violates the Equal Protection clause. It survives consti-
tutional attack only if the municipality can show the discrimination is
justified by a compelling governmental interest, which the courts sel-
dom find.
B. State Exclusionary Zoning Cases
Racially discriminatory zoning is exclusionary because suburban
municipalities use it to exclude racial minorities. Suburban zoning is
exclusionary without necessarily being racially discriminatory if subur-
10. But see Ackerman, supra note 7.
I1. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary
Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1217 (1977).
12. 429 U.S. at 270-71.
13. Id. at 270 n.21.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Calmore, Fair Housing and the Black Poor: An Advocacy Guide, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 609, 645 (1984) (same decision test invites after-the-fact ration-
alization that is no more than a pretext).
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ban municipalities adopt land use regulations that restrict housing op-
portunities for lower income groups. Some state courts have struck
down suburban exclusionary zoning in cases in which racial discrimi-
nation was not an issue.' 7 These decisions applied substantive due pro-
cess or equal protection provisions in state constitutions or "general
welfare" provisions in zoning enabling statutes to require suburban
zoning to provide housing opportunities for lower income groups.
State cases invalidating exclusionary zoning sometimes reverse the
presumption of constitutionality. As the New Jersey Supreme Court
held in a landmark exclusionary zoning case, municipalities must pro-
vide zoning opportunities to meet their fair share of regional housing
needs. This duty includes a "presumptive obligation" to "affirma-
tively" provide a "reasonable opportunity" for low and moderate cost
housing through land use regulation.'" The "presumptive obligation"
must be met "unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy
burden of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it
should not be required to do so."' 9 New York also requires municipal-
ities to meet regional housing needs. The presumption is reversed once
an exclusionary effect together with a failure to balance local desires
with regional housing need is shown.2"
C. Free Speech Cases
The Supreme Court's decision to extend the free speech clause to
commercial speech 2' opened the way for applying this clause to land
use regulations. The Court has applied the free speech clause to land
use regulations restricting billboards and adult sex businesses.22 In
17 The New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the strongest position against subur-
ban exclusionary zoning. See Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II). Decisions invalidating or
expressing opposition to suburban exclusionary zoning have also been handed down in
California, New York and Pennsylvania. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW
§§ 7.11-7.18, 7.20 (1982 & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as LAND USE LAW].
18. Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 179,
336 A.2d 713, 727-28, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount
Laurel I).
19. Id.
20. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.
2d 338, 345, 414 N.E.2d 680, 683-84, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183-84 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1042 (1981). See generally Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341
N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
21. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
22. LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, at §§ 5.38-5.40, 11.9-11.11.
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these cases, the Court has frequently reviewed the constitutionality of
legislation restricting commercial speech under criteria it adopted in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission.23
These criteria require that commercial speech not be misleading and
that it must concern a lawful activity. The government interest in reg-
ulation must be substantial. If both these requirements are met, gov-
ernment regulation must directly advance the governmental interest
asserted and must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.
A reference to the statement of the presumption in Carolene Prod-
ucts2" indicates the Central Hudson criteria for legislation restricting
commercial speech accomplish a presumption reversal. Carolene Prod-
ucts asks only whether facts generally assumed support the legislative
judgment. Central Hudson requires government regulation of commer-
cial speech to directly advance a legitimate governmental interest in the
least restrictive manner.25
This reversal of the presumption allows the Court to examine sub-
stantive due process and equal protection objections to land use regula-
tions restricting commercial speech more rigorously. The legitimacy of
a governmental purpose in land use regulation, for example, usually is
resolved under the due process clause as a problem in substantive due
process. The Central Hudson criteria convert the substantive due pro-
cess inquiry into a free speech inquiry with the presumption reversed.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego2 6 is an example. As part of its
holding, the plurality opinion applied the Central Hudson criteria that
regulations restricting commercial speech must directly advance a le-
gitimate governmental interest in the least restrictive manner.27 It held
that a prohibition in the ordinance on commercial billboards met these
criteria because it was justified by traffic safety and aesthetic considera-
tions. Without the free speech overlay, courts usually reject substan-
tive due process objections to a billboard prohibition by applying the
presumption of constitutionality. Metromedia upheld the billboard
prohibition, but only because the Court was satisfied the prohibition
was justified with the presumption reversed. The Court did strike
23. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
24. See text accompanying notes 3-8.
25. See Mandelker, The Free Speech Revolution in Land Use Control, 60 CmI-KENT
L. REV. 51 (1984).
26. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
27. Id. at 507.
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down the ordinance, but only because it found other restrictions in the
ordinance that violated the free speech clause.28
D. Unrelated Family and Group Home Cases
Zoning ordinances that exclude unrelated families and group homes
from residential districts invite presumption reversal. Unrelated fami-
lies and individuals who live in group homes qualify as "discrete and
insular" minorities. Their life style is different from the family life style
contemplated in zoning districts dedicated to single family living.
Group homes usually are established for the mentally retarded, the
mentally disabled, and other disadvantaged groups. The life style of
the unrelated family does not match the life style of the related nuclear
family.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,29 the Supreme Court upheld a
municipal ordinance limiting the size of unrelated families against due
process and equal protection objections by applying the presumption of
constitutionality. Some state courts have not followed Belle Terre.3° A
California case, City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,31 is an example.
Relying on a right of privacy guaranteed by the state constitution, the
court applied an ends-and-means analysis similar to strict scrutiny
equal protection review. It invalidated a zoning ordinance allowing no
more than five unrelated persons to live together.
A number of state courts have also invalidated zoning restrictions on
group homes, usually avoiding constitutional questions by holding
these homes were permitted as a "family" use under the zoning ordi-
nance.32 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,3 3 the Supreme
Court invalidated a special use permit denial for a group home for the
mentally retarded in a multifamily zoning district. The Court's deci-
sion was narrow. It refused to hold the mentally retarded were a quasi-
suspect class entitled to heightened middle tier judicial review under
28. Id. at 521.
29. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
30. LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, at § 5.3.
31. 27 Cal.3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980). See also State v. Baker,
81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1980).
32. LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, at § 5.5.
33. 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985). For discussion of this case, see The Supreme Court-
Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 161 (1985). See also Conner, Zoning Discrimi-
nation Affecting Retarded Persons, 29 WASH. U.J. OF URB. & CONTEMP. LAW 67
(1985).
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the equal protection clause.34 This holding would partly have reversed
the presumption of constitutionality. Neither did the Court invalidate
the zoning ordinance provision that required the special use permit.
What the Court did was to apply the relaxed rational relationship
standard of equal protection judicial review it applies to legislation af-
fecting economic interests. The Court applied this relaxed standard to
hold the permit denial unconstitutional.35 This holding is even more
startling than a holding that middle tier equal protection review applies
to the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class.3 6 The Court has
rarely applied the rational relationship standard to invalidate legisla-
tion under the equal protection clause. That it did so in Cleburne
shows it may be taking the presumption of constitutionality less seri-
ously, at least when land use regulation affects "discrete and insular
minorities." 7
This conclusion holds even though the Court's decision in Cleburne
is limited. The special use requirement was blatantly arbitrary because
it did not apply to similar group homes and because the reasons given
by the city for denying the special use permit were not legitimate zon-
ing reasons.38 Even so, Cleburne may signal a change in the applica-
tion of the presumption when a zoning ordinance restricts or excludes
unwanted land uses that have minority status.
IV. THE DEVELOPER'S CASE: SHOULD A PRESUMPTION
REVERSAL BE LEGISLATED?
This review of the cases indicates that courts have reversed the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when fundamental rights are restricted or
"discrete and insular" minorities are disadvantaged by land use regula-
34. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (classifications by gender must serve
"important" governmental objectives and must be "substantially" related to achieve-
ment of those objectives).
35. A footnote to the Court's decision indicates it believes Belle Terre is still good
constitutional law. Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3254 n.8. This reaffirmance of Belle Terre is
surprising. Zoning restrictions affecting unrelated families are as suspect as zoning re-
strictions affecting group homes.
36. For a state decision decided before Cleburne and holding in a group home case
that the mentally retarded are a quasi-suspect class see Clark v. Manuel, 463 So.2d 1276
(La. 1985).
37. See also Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 489 A.2d 600 (1985)
(holding middle-tier equal protection judicial review applies to all zoning regulations).
38. For example, one reason for denying the permit was the fears of neighbors con-
cerning the group home residents. 105 S.Ct. at 3259.
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tion. In what other cases would adoption of the legislative "vital and
pressing" standard reverse the presumption? The clear case is one in
which a developer owns land subject to a restrictive land use regulation
and would like to develop his land for a more intensive use. The con-
stitutional clause that protects the landowner in this situation is the
taking of property clause.39 Developers who believe a land use restric-
tion is too restrictive can bring an action claiming it is a taking of
property.
An explicit presumption does not apply under taking law as devel-
oped by the Supreme Court. The Court applies a number of taking
"factors" that do not add up to a "set formula."' Although these fac-
tors are presumptively neutral and do not favor either government or
developer, the Court has applied them in most cases to uphold land use
regulation against taking claims.41 Because the courts have selectively
reversed the presumption when more rigorous review of land use regu-
lation is required, the real argument of "vital and pressing" standard
advocates is with judicial interpretation of the taking clause. Legisla-
tive adoption of this standard would effectively repeal the taking clause
as it is now interpreted. The question is whether legislative repeal of
taking jurisprudence to favor developers in land use litigation is neces-
sary. Does the developer need protection in the political process in
which land use regulations are adopted and administered? If he does,
are there more acceptable alternatives to provide this protection that
do not require a wholesale revision of taking jurisprudence?
An evaluation of the developer's need for protection requires an ex-
amination of the parties in interest in land use regulation and their
ability to protect themselves from unfavorable political decisions in the
land use regulation process.42 Three parties in interest can be identi-
fied. The first is the developer who objects to a land use restriction that
prohibits development he would like to carry out. The second are
neighboring landowners who object to a zoning amendment granted to
a developer and who bring an action to have it invalidated. The third
39. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. These factors are most fully elaborated in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
41. LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, at §§ 2.13-2.20.
42. For a more extensive discussion of the participants in the land use process see
Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto,
9 VT. L. REV. 193, 199-208 (1984).
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are racial and lower income minorities who are excluded from a com-
munity by exclusionary zoning ordinances.
Which of these parties is most in need of protection through pre-
sumption reversal? Excluded third-party minorities have no political
voice in the land use regulation process of the exclusionary community
and clearly qualify. Some courts, as noted earlier, protect third-party
minorities by invalidating exclusionary zoning and by reversing the
presumption of constitutionality.
Neighbors who wish to challenge rezonings for developers face diffi-
culties in bringing court actions because they are usually unorganized
and without resources. Unlike third-party minorities, neighboring
landowners who challenge rezonings for developers have not had the
presumption of constitutionality fully reversed. Neighbors are helped
only by the judicial doctrine governing "spot zoning," the term given
to a zoning amendment that changes a zoning regulation to permit a
development a developer would like to carry out. The spot zoning
rules do not entirely reverse the presumption of constitutionality,
although they require the municipality to justify the zoning amend-
ment in court.43 Only Oregon reversed the presumption in spot zoning
cases by characterizing zoning amendments as a quasi-judicial action
and by shifting the burden to justify the change to the municipality.'
Although developers are sometimes subject to abuse in the land use
regulation process, most observers believe they are least in need of pro-
tection in that process. Most communities welcome development, and
gladly work with developers to adopt zoning ordinances and provide
zoning amendments that will allow development to proceed. Unlike
neighboring property owners and third-party minorities, developers
participate actively in the local political process, where they usually are
heavy campaign contributors. To the extent developers face problems
in the land use regulation process, reforms in that process can protect
them without requiring the radical reversal in land use law the vital
and pressing standard would legislate.
The Report of the President's Commission does not justify the vital
and pressing standard by the need to protect either third-party minori-
ties who challenge exclusionary zoning, or neighboring property own-
ers who challenge zoning amendments for developers. The
Commission's Report justifies the standard by the need to "protect
43. LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, at §§ 6.23-6.27.
44. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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property rights and to increase the production of housing and lower its
cost."4 5 Both justifications indicate the presumption reversal legislated
by the vital and pressing standard applies to developer litigation chal-
lenging restrictive zoning. This type of litigation protects the property
rights of developers in the development of their property. It also aids
the production of housing and lower housing costs because a court de-
cision invalidating a restrictive zoning regulation makes more land
available for housing development.
The vital and pressing standard could apply to litigation by third-
party minorities who challenge exclusionary zoning, but the courts
have been able to reverse the presumption in these cases without legis-
lative assistance. The vital and pressing standard does not apply to
litigation by neighbors who challenge rezonings for developers, and the
Commission's statement of statutory intent indicates it should not ap-
ply in these cases. Reversing the presumption in cases challenging
rezonings for developers restricts rather than protects property rights.
It could also make housing less available and more costly if the rezon-
ing was for more intensive housing development, such as multifamily
housing. The presumption reversal legislated by the vital and pressing
standard clearly is intended to apply primarily to litigation by develop-
ers challenging restrictive zoning regulations.
V. IF THE DEVELOPER NEEDS PROTECTION, How
SHOULD THIS BE DONE?
Although developers are least in need of protection in the land use
regulation process, they may be subject to abuse because of the way in
which the zoning process is conducted. The local governing body
adopts zoning amendments and the zoning amendment process usually
is undisciplined. If the rezoning process is held to be legislative, the
governing body need not provide adjudicative procedures, adopt stan-
dards for its decisions, or provide reasons if it denies a rezoning appli-
cation. The developer cannot challenge the municipality's case against
his rezoning through cross-examination before the governing body. He
cannot appeal the governing body's decision if the rezoning is denied.
His only recourse is to challenge the existing restrictive zoning as a
taking of property.
Even if the developer secures a zoning amendment, he is at risk in
the political process if the political composition of the governing body
45. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1.
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changes. The new governing body may oppose his development and
may revoke or modify the rezoning. A developer is protected against a
zoning change only if he can claim a vested right or a zoning estoppel.
Under the majority rule, a developer can claim a vested right or an
estoppel only if he relies in good faith on a building permit by making
substantial expenditures on his development.4 6 Unfortunately, a devel-
oper may be unable to protect himself in this manner if a political
change on the governing body occurs soon after he obtains a zoning
amendment, especially if his development is a major one and will take a
long time to complete.
A developer who is unhappy with a zoning amendment denial or a
change in the zoning regulations may always litigate in court, where he
may be successful. Successful litigation may still not give him what he
wants. Most courts will not order affirmative relief requiring the mu-
nicipality to adopt a zoning amendment allowing him to proceed with
his development.47 Only a few jurisdictions make affirmative relief of
this kind available to the successful litigating developer.48
All of these problems are very real and require attention, but none
are addressed by the legislative vital and pressing judicial review stan-
dard. Alternative reforms in the land use regulation process can rem-
edy this set of problems and protect the developer from unfair decision
making by zoning agencies. These reforms revise the decision making
process in which zoning decisions are made rather than the substantive
standards courts apply when reviewing zoning regulations. They also
revise the remedies available in developer litigation.
Reforms of the decision making process are not difficult to imple-
ment and have been available for some time. The decision making pro-
cess in land use regulation would be improved substantially if courts or
state legislatures required zoning decisions to comply with the policies
of the comprehensive plan and required quasi-judicial procedures for
zoning amendments. These procedures would allow developers the
right of cross-examination and would require governing bodies to state
the reasons for their decisions in writing. Some states have adopted
legislation that protects developers who receive final approval of a pro-
ject from restrictive changes in land use regulations for a period of
time.49 Legislation also can be adopted providing an affirmative devel-
46. LAND USE LAW, supra note 12, at §§ 6.11-6.20.
47. Id. at § 8.17.
48. Id. at § 8.18.
49. Id. at § 6.21.
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oper's remedy in land use litigation and courts holding the majority
view that an affirmative remedy is not available can change their posi-
tion. All of these reforms would help protect developers in the land
use regulation and litigation process and none require modification or
repeal of the presumption of constitutionality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The presumption of constitutionality reflects the judicial assumption
that the political process can discipline decision making in land use
regulation. The Carolene Products footnote would reverse the pre-
sumption only when land use regulation restricts the exercise of funda-
mental rights, such as the right of free speech, or when it disadvantages
"discrete and insular minorities." Presumption reversal is justified in
these cases. Many courts have followed the Carolene Products footnote
by reversing the presumption in cases of this kind. Judicial willingness
to reverse the presumption of constitutionality when reversal is re-
quired shows that legislative reversal in all land use litigation is not
necessary.
Because developers do not qualify for more heightened judicial pro-
tection under the Carolene Products footnote, they are the principal
beneficiaries of a vital and pressing standard that reverses the presump-
tion in land use litigation. Developers sometimes are at risk, not be-
cause land use regulation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, but
because the decision making and litigation process can be unfair to
them. Reforms in the decision making and litigation process can pro-
tect developers from unfair decision making. None of these reforms
requires reversal of the presumptions of constitutionality. The case for
the vital and pressing judicial review standard has not been made.
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